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The Effects of Higher Gasoline Prices on U.S. Light 
Vehicle Sales, Prices, and Variable Profit by Segment 




The rising gasoline prices of the past few years were not associated with shifts from 
vehicles with lower MPG to vehicles with higher MPG. This has been seen as evidence 
that gasoline prices have little impact on the purchase choices of new-vehicle buyers. 
However, this paper presents new evidence that the shifts toward vehicles with higher 
MPG that the rising price of gasoline would have caused were not observed because they 
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1 The research reported in this paper was part of a larger study of the effects of gasoline 
prices on the vehicle market conducted with the Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center, and the Planning Edge.   2 
Introduction 
This paper examines the effects on the U.S. automotive industry of two trends that have 
coincided since 2001, a rising real price of gasoline and growth in direct-to-consumer 
incentives. The rise in the real price of gasoline has been modest in historical terms, and 
sales of low-mileage sport utility vehicles and pickups have been stable, leading many 
observers to conclude that consumer demand has not been responsive to the rise in 
gasoline prices. 
 
However, this conclusion ignores both the substantial increase by manufacturers in 
direct-to-consumer incentives since 2001 and the differential increase in incentives by 
segment. This paper presents evidence that the incentives offset a shift to vehicles with 
higher fuel economy that would have resulted from the higher gasoline prices. 
 
A nested multinomial logistic regression model of vehicle choice is used to decompose 
the change in segment sales into gasoline price effects, incentive effects, and other 
effects. The estimates of the elasticity of vehicle sales (by segment) to gasoline prices 
derived in this study can be used to predict the impact of sustained or higher gasoline 
prices in the future. 
Gasoline Prices 
The figure below shows annual average nominal and real prices of gasoline since 1970. 
In 2001 the real price of gasoline was $1.66 per gallon. By 2004 the price of a gallon of 
gasoline had risen to $1.96. The lowest price in the past five years (2000-2004) was $1.54 
per gallon in 2002. 
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In historical terms the 2004 price of $1.96 was low. It was 31% below the peak real price 
of $2.86 per gallon in 1981, and it was two cents below the average real price from 1929   3 
to 2004. However, it would be reasonable to predict that an 18% to 27% increase in the 
price of gasoline would affect new-vehicle-buying decisions on the margin. The present 
value of the fuel costs of operating a vehicle over its life represent about 15% of the total 
present value of acquisition and operation costs, so an 18% to 27% increase in the price 
of gasoline is equivalent to a 3% to 4% increase in the price of the vehicle. The price of 
gasoline increased 18% from 2001 to 2004 and 27% from 2002 to 2004, so it would be 
reasonable to have predicted an effect on vehicle sales and segment mix. However, the 
surprising reality was that there was not much of an effect. 
Light Vehicle Sales by Type and Segment 
The figure below shows share of sales by light vehicle segments in 2001 and 2004. Sport 
utility vehicles (SUVs) and pickups had lower fuel economy than crossover utility 
vehicles (CUVs), minivans, and passenger cars (PC), but between 2001 and 2004 SUVs 
lost less than one-half a point of share and pickups held their share. Large pickups and 
large and large luxury SUVs, which have the lowest MPG, actually gained share. 
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Thus the increase in the price of gasoline since 2001 does not appear to have been 
associated with a shift toward segments with higher fuel economy. To form a more   4 
complete picture of the 2001 to 2004 experience, however, one needs to know what 
happened to prices of vehicles during the period of rising gasoline prices, since reducing 
the price of the vehicle can offset the increase in operating cost caused by the higher 
gasoline price. OSAT used the limited publicly available data and expert judgment to 
estimate light vehicle retail transaction prices, direct-to-consumer incentives, and variable 
profit by segment and manufacturer group in 2001-2004. 
Prices and Variable Profit 
Vehicle manufacturers release their total sales by model to the public monthly, but not 
their retail sales (sales to individual consumers) or retail transaction prices (what buyers 
are paying at the dealerships net of all discounts in cash, reduced-rate financing, or other 
forms). Estimates of retail transaction prices and customer incentives are made by various 
organizations, including Edmunds.com, J.D. Power and Associates, and CNW Marketing 
Research. These organizations regularly publish some of their information at various 
levels of detail. OSAT estimated retail transaction prices and customer incentives by 
triangulating the publicly available data, matching the detail available to the level used by 
OSAT, and interpolating to fill gaps. The figure below shows OSAT’s estimates of retail 
transaction prices in 2001 and 2004 for six aggregate segments. The labels above the bars 
show the percent drop from 2001 to 2004. 
 



























SUVs and pickups had the highest prices, and passenger cars and large vans had the 
lowest prices in 2001. The average retail transaction price for each of the aggregate 
segments fell between 2001 and 2004. Pickups and minivans had the greatest percentage 
decline in retail price and large vans the smallest percentage decline in retail price. The   5 
other segments experienced percentage price reductions that were clustered around the 
overall average. 
 
The segment transaction price changes between 2001 and 2004 have more than one 
potential source. Direct-to-consumer incentives grew dramatically in this period and 
clearly played a role in reducing transaction prices. The mix of models within segments 
also changed as some models were discontinued, other models were introduced, and 
consumers switched between models. Equipment and features offered by manufacturers 
and chosen by consumers also change transaction prices. 
 
To isolate the effects of increasing incentives from the other confounding effects OSAT 
focused on estimates of manufacturer revenue and variable profit in 2001 and 2004. 
Using 2001 as a suitable baseline for “normal” variable profit, OSAT estimated variable 
profit by segment and manufacturer group in 2001 using a simple framework. The 
framework made the following assumptions. 
•  Manufacturer revenue averaged 97% of the transaction price. 
•  Manufacturer revenue varied by manufacturer, segment, and transaction price. 
•  Variable profit averaged 25% of manufacturer revenue across all segments and 
manufacturers. 
•  Variable profit (as a percentage of manufacturer revenue) did not substantially 
differ by manufacturer. 
•  The variable profit rate was positively related to transaction price. 
 
The figure below shows OSAT’s estimates of variable profit per vehicle by aggregate 
segment 2001 and 2004. The labels above the columns in the figure are the dollar 
decrease in variable profit from 2001 and 2004 by aggregate segment. 
 


























The growth in incentives reduced variable profit per vehicle by $1,000 on average. 
Variable profit fell the most in SUVs (down $1,941) and pickups (down $1,333).   6 
Validating Variable Profit Estimates 
The process of estimating variable profit was iterative. The first set of estimates was 
shared with industry analysts who gave their opinions as to whether the estimates were 
credible and roughly accurate. Based on their feedback, the estimates were revised and 
shared with them again. In all, there were about three rounds in the process. 
 
The estimates were improved by the feedback received from the industry analysts, but 
any inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the estimates are the sole responsibility of OSAT. 
The final decisions about the numerical estimates to use in the report were made by 
OSAT acting alone. The industry analysts listed below reviewed and commented on our 
estimates. The listing an analyst is not and should not be construed as an endorsement by 
the analyst of any of the following: the accuracy of the estimates, the conclusions about 
the profit position of any company derived from the estimates contained in this report, the 
overall conclusions of the report, or the policy recommendations of the report. OSAT 
appreciates their assistance. 
•  Michael Bruynesteyn, Prudential Equity Group LLC 
•  Stephen Girsky, Morgan Stanley 
•  Maryann Keller, Maryann Keller & Associates 
Fuel Economy and Operating Cost 
The EPA reports fuel economy for new vehicles annually (model year) for hundreds of 
vehicle configurations. EPA defines configurations by make, model, engine, 
transmission, the relevant emissions rules the vehicles are sold under, and the region 
where the vehicles can be sold. Aggregating the configuration-level data to the segment 
and manufacturer group is complicated by the fact that the publicly available EPA data 
do not include sales by configuration.
2 To estimate MPG at the segment and 
manufacturer group level OSAT first estimated MPG by model using the EPA data, and 
applying judgment about where in the range to place the average. Aggregating from these 
estimates to the level of segment and manufacturer group was a straightforward 












MPG is the harmonic mean for the segment-manufacturer group, Salesi and MPGi are the 
sales and MPG of the i
th model in the segment-manufacturer group, and the summations 
are done across all models in the segment-manufacturer group. 
                                                 
2 Public EPA data do not include sales by configuration, but EPA obtains the information 
on sales by configuration from the manufacturers and appends it to the public data to 
produce the annual report, "Light-Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy 
Trends: 1975 Through 2004" (EPA420-R-04-001, April 2004). Even the historical data 
from this report are not publicly available. The policy that keeps the data from the public 
prevents researchers from answering many important questions.   7 
 
The figure below shows the change in the present value
3 of fuel cost of driving 15,000 
miles per year for 2001 to 2004 and 2002 to 2004. 
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Nested Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 
The price of gasoline rose by 18% from 2001 to 2004 and by 27% from 2002 to 2004, 
increasing the cost of operating vehicles, especially SUVs and pickups. Over the same 
period manufacturers increased direct-to-consumer incentives substantially, especially for 
SUVs and pickups. To disentangle and quantify these two effects, simulations were run 
with a nested multinomial logistic regression model OSAT developed for a study jointly 
conducted with the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Michigan Manufacturing 




The consumer’s choice of an individual vehicle model is a discrete, multi-step process. 
The figure shows the consumer’s decision as a Decision Tree. In the first step the 
                                                 
3 PV parameters: 17.2%, 14 years to match Congressional Budget Office, “The Economic 
Costs of Fuel Economy Standards Versus a Gasoline Tax,” Dec. 2003.   8 
consumer chooses which of the broad types of vehicles he/she wants: crossover utility 
vehicle (CUV), minivan (MINIVAN), passenger car (PC), pickup (PU), sport utility 
vehicle (SUV), and large van (VN). 
   
The second step is the choice of a vehicle segment within the vehicle type. This choice is 
conditional on the type of vehicle chosen in first step. A consumer who chose the 
crossover vehicle type would then choose among luxury (CUVLUX), midsize 
(CUVMID), and small (CUVSML), and similarly for the other types and segments. 
 
In the third step the consumer chooses among the individual models within the segment. 
 
The structure of the nested multinomial model describes the highly complex discrete 
choice process with a minimum of parameter assumptions. This is in contrast to an 
unconstrained elasticity model in which the number of parameters that need to be 
estimated is very large. In 2004 there were 287 individual models for the consumer to 
choose from. The unconstrained elasticity matrix for this choice would have (287)
2 = 
82,369 own- and cross-price-elasticities to estimate. 
 
In the research and policy literature on vehicle choice the unweildy unconstrained 
elasticity matrix is reduced by imposing restrictions. A recent CBO study
4 collapsed the 
full make-model choice set to 60 (6 makes and 10 segments). In the midsize car segment, 
for example, the study collapsed models from Chrvrolet, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Buick, and 
Saturn into a single aggreagte, “GM Midsize Car.” Even with this level of aggregation, 
the model required (60)
2 = 3,600 own- and cross-price-elasticity estimates. 
 
Another example of the use of an elasticity model was the study by Kleit
5 Kleit uses a 
model with 11 vehicle segments and 4 aggregate makes (GM, Ford, Chrysler, and other), 
implying (44)
2 =  1,936 own- and cross-price-elasticities. 
 
The possibility of replicating the models used by the CBO and Kleit was explored for this 
study, but turned out to be infeasible. Both studies rely on estimates of own- and cross-
price-elasticities derived from models developed by economists at GM that are not 
publicly available. Kleit reported 121 aggregate elasticities at the segment level, and the 
CBO did not report any estimates of elasticities at all. 
 
In addition to being incapable of being exactly replicated, the Kleit and CBO models also 
do not follow the conventional econometric approach to discrete choice. McFadden’s 
multinomial logistic regression model
6 is the most widely used discrete choice model due 
                                                 
4 “The Economic Costs of Fuel Economy Standards Versus a Gasoline Tax,” Dec. 2003. 
5 Andrew N. Kleit, “Impacts of Long-Range Increases in the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) Standard,” Economic Inquiry 42:2 (April 2004) 279-294. (Originally 
distributed as a working paper by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 
in October 2002). 
6 McFadden, D., “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In 
Zaremmbka, P. (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, New York, 1973.   9 
to its simple structure and ease of estimation. However, the multinomial logistic 
regression model imposes the restriction that the distribution of the random error terms is 
independent and identical over alternatives. This restriction leads to the “independence of 
irrelevant alternatives” property that makes the cross-elasticities between all pairs of 
alternatives identical to each other. This representation of choice behavior produces 
biased estimates and inaccurate predictions in cases that violate these strict conditions. 




The model used in this study to estimate the impact of changes in fuel prices and vehicle 
prices is a nested multinomial logitistic regression model. The number of elasticities that 
need to be estimated is 20 (the number of vehicle types plus segments plus 1). The model 
was calibrated to 2002-2003 data following the procedure described in a recent study by 
Greene, Duleep, and McManus
8. 
 
The essence of the model is captured by the vehicle ranking equation: 
 
  
uij = b(Ai+ wlxil + eij)
l=1
K
  . 
 
Here uij is the ranking score for the i
th vehicle for the j
th individual, wij the weight of the 
l
th attribute, xil , and eij  the j
th individual’s random component for the i
th make and model. 
By convention, the weight for vehicle price is 1, so that the units of wlxil are dollars. 
Greene, Duleep, and McManus (2004) included several variables in their analysis, and 
the present study uses only two: vehicle price and fuel cost per mile. Transaction price in 
2004 is the price paid by the buyer net of cash and other incentives. Fuel cost per mile is 
measured as the price of gasoline ($1.96 in 2004) divided by the segment MPG. 
 
In the equation, the term b is referred to as the “price slope” and is derived from the price 
elasticity. The “fuel cost per mile slope” in the equation is b•w, where b is the “price 
slope” and w the weight of fuel cost per mile in the equation. Assuming that consumers 
rank vehicles strictly according to the sum of the out-of-pocket transaction price and the 
present value of the anticipated fuel cost, w equals the present discounted value of the 
anticipated total lifetime vehicle miles. OSAT used the CBO’s assumptions for vehicle 
life (14 years), discount rate (12%), and the decay in miles driven as vehicles age (5.2%). 
 
Many have suggested that consumers react differently to a $1 (present value) changes in 
out-of-pocket cash than they do to a $1 (present value) change in fuel cost. To allow for 
this, the assumption that consumers rank vehicles strictly according to the sum of the out-
of-pocket transaction price and the present value of the anticipated fuel cost was relaxed. 
                                                 
7 Williams, H.C.W. L. “On the Formulation of Travel Demand Models and Economic 
Evaluation Measures of User Benefit,” Environment and Planning, 9A, No.3, pp.285-
344, 1977. 
8 Greene, D.L., Duleep, K.G.; McManus, W.S.; “Future Potential of Hybrid and Diesel 
Powertrains in the U.S. Light-Duty Vehicle Market,” 2004   10 
The 3-year calibrated model resulted in fitted values of w that were within 5% of what 
they would be under the strict assumption. The difference in impact on choice of cash and 
fuel cost was trivial. 
 
The table below gives the price, fuel economy, assumed price elasticity, price slope, and 
fuel cost per mile slope for the vehicle types and segments in the decision tree. 
 












    $26,335   (1.00)  6  16.7%  (0.00005)  20.0   (3.54) 
CUV    $25,262   (2.00)  3  33.3%  (0.00012)  21.6   (9.27) 
CUV  CUVLUX  $35,619   (3.00)  7  14.3%  (0.00010)  20.0   (7.88) 
CUV  CUVMID  $25,966   (3.00)  12  8.3%  (0.00013)  20.6   (9.82) 
CUV  CUVSML  $20,414   (3.00)  11  9.1%  (0.00016)  23.6   (12.45) 
MINIVAN  MINIVAN  $25,942   (2.00)  18  5.6%  (0.00008)  20.1   (6.34) 
PC    $23,569   (2.00)  3  33.3%  (0.00013)  24.7   (10.00) 
PC  LUX  $39,146   (3.00)  71  1.4%  (0.00008)  21.6   (6.34) 
PC  MID  $21,964   (3.00)  54  1.9%  (0.00014)  24.0   (10.82) 
PC  SML  $15,668   (3.00)  30  3.3%  (0.00020)  29.3   (15.19) 
PU    $27,657   (2.00)  2  50.0%  (0.00014)  15.8   (11.03) 
PU  PULRG  $29,436   (3.00)  8  12.5%  (0.00012)  15.1   (8.90) 
PU  PUSML  $20,964   (3.00)  10  10.0%  (0.00016)  19.0   (12.02) 
SUV    $33,231   (2.00)  5  20.0%  (0.00008)  16.5   (5.87) 
SUV  SUVLLX  $49,215   (3.00)  12  8.3%  (0.00007)  14.8   (5.34) 
SUV  SUVLRG  $36,721   (3.00)  9  11.1%  (0.00009)  15.1   (7.18) 
SUV  SUVMID  $28,348   (3.00)  18  5.6%  (0.00011)  17.6   (8.67) 
SUV  SUVMLX  $43,750   (3.00)  12  8.3%  (0.00007)  16.4   (6.00) 
SUV  SUVSML  $22,095   (3.00)  5  20.0%  (0.00017)  18.4   (12.86) 
VN  VANLRG  $22,660   (2.00)  10  10.0%  (0.00010)  16.5   (7.37) 
 
Estimates of the Effects of Fuel Price, Vehicle Price, and Other 
Factors 
The calibrated multinomial logistic regression model was used in two simulations for this 
paper. The first simulation estimated what vehicle-model-level sales would have been in 
2002 if the price of gasoline had been $1.96 per gallon (the 2004 value) and if vehicle 
prices were unchanged at their 2002 values. The second simulation estimated what sales 
would have been in 2002 if the price of gasoline had been $1.96 per gallon and if vehicle 
prices had been lowered by the growth in direct-to-consumer incentives from 2002 to 
2004. 
 
The change is sales from their 2002 actual values to what they would have been had the 
price of gasoline been $1.96 per gallon measures the impact of fuel prices. The change in 
sales from what they would have been with the 2002 vehicle prices and gasoline at $1.96   11 
per gallon to what they would have been with the 2004 incentives and gasoline at $1.96 
measures the offsetting impact of increased direct-to-consumer incentives. The difference 
between what sales would have been with the 2004 incentives and gasoline at $1.96 and 
actual sales in 2004 measures other impacts. 
 
The figure below shows the simulated gasoline price effects and incentive effects by 
aggregate segment. The 18% increase in the price of gasoline, had it occurred in 2002, 
would have reduced SUV share by 0.8 percentage points and increased passenger car 
share by 0.9 percentage points. Increases in direct-to-consumer incentives would have, 
had they occurred in 2002, offset this shift and would have added 1.3 percentage points 
of share to SUVs while taking 0.7 percentage points from passenger cars and additional 




























This paper presented evidence that U.S. light vehicle sales would have responded to the 
increase in gasoline prices that occurred over the past few years, but that the shift in 
demand from segments with lower MPG to segments with higher MPG was offset by 
direct-to-consumer incentives from the vehicle manufacturers that were skewed toward 
segments with lower MPG. Gasoline was 18% more expensive in 2004 than it was in 
2001. This was the equivalent of a 3% increase in the price of the average vehicle and 
larger increases for vehicles with lower MPG. It would be reasonable to expect changes 
of this magnitude to have an impact on sales. 
 
The fact that sales of low MPG segments did not fall between 2001 and 2004 led the 
investigation in another direction. Direct-to-consumer incentives increased substantially   12 
since September 2001, beginning with a major zero-interest loan campaign that was 
launched by General Motors within two weeks of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
U.S. By the end of 2004, the average incentive had risen by $1,000 (4% of vehicle price) 
and by nearly $2,000 for SUVs (6% of vehicle price). These incentives essentially offset 
the shifts that higher gasoline prices would have caused. 
 
The gasoline price and incentive effects did not occur in a vacuum. In the period from 
2001 to 2003 the offsetting shifts described in this paper were small compared to two 
broader market shifts, driven largely by new products. Extended cab pickups and sport 
utility pickups that combined features of SUVs and pickup trucks grew by almost a 
percentage point of market share at the expense of SUVs. New CUV models added 
almost 4 points of share to that aggregate segment at the expense of passenger cars. 
 
Higher gasoline prices increase the demand for vehicles with higher MPG relative to the 
demand for vehicles with lower MPG. Vehicle manufacturers who assign a higher 
probability to sustained or rising gasoline prices than they do to a return to lower prices 
should seek ways to increase the MPG of their products. Suppliers with technologies or 
products that can improve fuel economy should be able to gain sales and profits as 
concern about higher gasoline prices continues to influence consumers.   13 


















Crossover Utility Vehicle Luxury Detroit 31,754 $7,800 90,058 $5,500 $0.2
Crossover Utility Vehicle Luxury Europe 30,678 $9,500 55,289 $9,400 $0.2
Crossover Utility Vehicle Luxury Japan 118,341 $9,600 166,036 $9,600 $0.5
Crossover Utility Vehicle Midsize Detroit 191,899 $5,900 399,018 $4,600 $0.7
Crossover Utility Vehicle Midsize Japan 86,699 $7,400 323,292 $7,200 $1.7
Crossover Utility Vehicle Midsize Other 46,248 $5,900 70,827 $4,200 $0.0
Crossover Utility Vehicle Small Detroit 144,717 $5,000 258,873 $2,800 $0.0
Crossover Utility Vehicle Small Japan 204,681 $5,500 326,535 $5,500 $0.7
Crossover Utility Vehicle Small Other 111,058 $5,300 195,048 $4,200 $0.2
Minivan Minivan Detroit 806,412 $5,800 621,903 $4,800 ($1.7)
Minivan Minivan Japan 248,742 $7,000 359,787 $7,000 $0.8
Minivan Minivan Other 47,281 $4,800 86,009 $3,300 $0.1
Passenger Car Large Detroit 542,642 $5,900 345,474 $3,800 ($1.9)
Passenger Car Luxury Detroit 416,546 $8,600 415,365 $8,100 ($0.2)
Passenger Car Luxury Europe 590,410 $10,400 649,107 $10,300 $0.5
Passenger Car Luxury Japan 370,430 $8,200 384,585 $8,200 $0.1
Passenger Car Luxury Other 37,077 $5,100 4,397 $4,600 ($0.2)
Passenger Car Midsize Detroit 2,171,642 $4,500 1,683,587 $2,600 ($5.4)
Passenger Car Midsize Europe 279,424 $5,300 187,480 $5,100 ($0.5)
Passenger Car Midsize Japan 1,133,694 $5,000 1,235,516 $4,700 $0.1
Passenger Car Midsize Other 454,422 $4,700 443,904 $3,300 ($0.7)
Passenger Car Small Detroit 1,011,429 $3,000 720,045 $2,000 ($1.6)
Passenger Car Small Europe 96,472 $4,700 66,826 $4,500 ($0.2)
Passenger Car Small Japan 766,071 $3,500 814,146 $3,100 ($0.2)
Passenger Car Small Other 506,205 $3,600 473,088 $2,800 ($0.5)
Pickup Large Detroit 2,178,644 $7,200 2,298,972 $5,500 ($3.0)
Pickup Large Japan 108,863 $6,800 196,332 $6,500 $0.5
Pickup Small Detroit 631,182 $4,900 429,569 $3,700 ($1.5)
Pickup Small Japan 251,417 $4,900 223,635 $3,800 ($0.4)
Pickup Small Other 26,246 $3,800 10,266 $3,400 ($0.1)
Sport Utility Vehicle Large Luxury Detroit 63,797 $13,800 141,999 $11,300 $0.7
Sport Utility Vehicle Large Luxury Europe 0 $13,000 57,299 $13,000 $0.7
Sport Utility Vehicle Large Luxury Japan 16,946 $13,700 65,180 $13,700 $0.7
Sport Utility Vehicle Large Detroit 848,709 $9,500 775,198 $6,300 ($3.2)
Sport Utility Vehicle Large Japan 117,590 $11,100 95,389 $10,900 ($0.3)
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Detroit 1,194,413 $7,200 1,208,403 $4,100 ($3.6)
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Europe 0 $10,900 27,706 $10,900 $0.3
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Japan 258,970 $7,400 219,021 $6,700 ($0.4)
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Other 158,701 $6,000 102,367 $4,700 ($0.5)
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Luxury Detroit 23,867 $8,300 1,973 $6,200 ($0.2)
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Luxury Europe 114,155 $13,200 97,903 $13,200 ($0.2)
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Luxury Japan 18,735 $11,000 30,974 $11,000 $0.1
Sport Utility Vehicle Midsize Luxury Other 30,653 $6,700 8,334 $4,200 ($0.2)
Sport Utility Vehicle Small Detroit 121,198 $5,800 92,448 $4,600 ($0.3)
Sport Utility Vehicle Small Other 76,362 $4,700 8,457 $4,700 ($0.3)
Large Van Large Van Detroit 427,039 $4,700 377,370 $4,400 ($0.3)
Large Van Large Van Europe 5,600 $6,900 10,441 $6,900 $0.0
All Segments 17,118,061 $6,077 16,855,431 $5,077 ($18.5)  